January 28th
Ian Olasov (CUNY)
February 4th
Ulf Hlobil (Pittsburgh)
February 11th
Daniel Greco (NYU/Yale)
February 18th
No Workshop (President's Day)
February 25th
Philipp Koralus (Wash U)
March 4th
Daniel Fogal (NYU)
March 11th
Daniel Harris (CUNY)
March 18th
No Workshop (Spring Break)
March 25th
Jack Woods (Princeton)
April 1st
Christoph Pfisterer (Zürich)
April 8th
Arancha San Ginés (Columbia)
April 15th
Cory Nichols (Princeton)
April 22nd
Jennifer Carr (MIT)
April 29th
Jessica Keiser (Yale)
May 6th
Will Starr (Cornell)
May 13th
Katrina Przyjemski (NYU)
January 11th - Friday at 3:00pm
Josh Armstrong (Rutgers)
January 18th - Friday at 3:00pm
David Pereplyotchik (Hamilton College)
September 11th
Karen Lewis (Barnard/Columbia)
September 18th
Alex Anthony (Rutgers)
September 25th
Ashley Atkins (Princeton)
October 2nd
Justin Khoo (Yale)
October 9th
Dirk Kinderman (St. Andrews/Rutgers)
October 23rd
Nate Bulthuis (Cornell)
November 13th
Carlotta Pavese (Rutgers)
November 20th
Ben Phillips (CUNY)
December 4th
Michael Schweiger (NYU)
February 2nd
Nate Bice (Columbia)
February 9th
Ariadna Pop (Columbia)
February 16th
Cory Nichols (Princeton)
February 23rd
Lars Dänzer (Köln/NYU)
March 1st
Jesse Rappaport (CUNY)
March 8th
Han Wezenberg (Humboldt/NYU)
March 22nd
Elmar Unnsteinsson (CUNY)
March 29th
Paolo Bonardi (Geneva)
April 5th
Guillermo Del Pinal (Columbia)
April 26th
Eliot Michaelson (UCLA)
May 3rd
Lisa Miracchi (Rutgers)
September 13th
Daniel Harris (CUNY)
September 20th
Max Barkhausen (NYU)
September 27th
Matt Moss (Columbia)
October 4th
David Pereplyotchik (CUNY)
October 18th
Daniel Fogal (NYU)
October 25th
Josh Armstrong (Rutgers)
November 2nd
Rachel McKinney (CUNY)
November 15th
Jack Woods (Princeton)
November 22nd
Oliver Marshall (CUNY)
November 29th
Nemira Gasiunas (Columbia)
December 6th
Yu Guo (NYU)
Our meeting this Thursday (February 23rd) will be led by Lars Dänzer, a PhD student at the University of Cologne who is visiting NYU’s philosophy department this year. Lars will present some of his work on language understanding, entitled ‘Understanding a Sentence of a Language’. Here is his abstract:
What is it to understand a sentence of a language? There are two traditional kinds of answers to this question. According to the first, understanding a sentence requires having propositional knowledge of some sort about the sentence or its components. According to the second, understanding a sentence does not require any such knowledge, but merely the possession of a certain ability or disposition. In the talk I’ll argue in favour of an account of the first sort, according to which understanding a sentence is (roughly) a matter of being in a state which, in one way or another, realizes possession of the information about the kind of speech act typically performed by speakers of the language in uttering the sentence. I’ll argue that this account emerges as the best way to resolve an apparent dilemma: On the one hand, the fact that understanding a sentence can be realized by different cognitive mechanisms in different subjects seems to force us towards an account in terms of abilities or dispositions. On the other, it appears that our only way to make sense of how we manage to understand the utterances of others is in inferential terms, which strongly counts in favour of some kind of propositional knowledge view after all.
As usual, the meeting will take place on Thursday evening at 7:00 in the third floor seminar room of NYU’s philosophy building. We hope to see you there!
Posted on 18 Feb 2012 | permalink